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In 1988, the Third Circuit, in deciding an international
racketeering claim which involved the awarding of military
procurement contracts, declined to apply the so-called "commer-
cial exception" to the act of state doctrine in denying the
defendant's contention that the case was not adjudicable.1
Although the court recognized the existence of the "commercial
exception" to the act of state doctrine, it held the exception to be
inapplicable to the case at hand.2 In declining to apply the
exception here, the court claimed that "the decision to award a
defense contract to one bidder or another is by its very nature
governmental" and therefore not commercial.' In recognizing the
existence of the "commercial exception," the court defined
"commercial" by the statutory scheme announced in the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 ("FSIA").4 The FSJA instructs
courts to define an activity's commercial character with attention
"not to the purpose of the act but to its nature."5 However, the
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See Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052,
1059 (3d Cir. 1988), affd, 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
2 See id. at 1059 ("We also agree with the district court that the so-called
'commercial' exception to the act of state doctrine ... has no application to
this case.").
3 Id.
' See id.; see also Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. % 1602-1611 (1994)).
1 Environmental Tectonics, 847 F.2d at 1059 (emphasis added).
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court invoked the act of state doctrine, not foreign sovereign
immunity, to reach this decision. By referring to the FSIA's
definition of commercial to determine what constitutes a "com-
mercial activity" under the act of state doctrine, the court
juxtaposed two similar, yet distinct, doctrines of international law
in a manner inconsistent with their purposes.
A detailed investigation of foreign sovereign immunity and the
act of state doctrine reveals that this merging of the two doctrines
is a tempting but incorrect application of international principles.
A better reasoned approach was announced by. the Ninth Circuit
in LAM v. OPEC in 1981. The court held that "[w]hile the FSIA
ignores the underlying purpose of a state's action, the act of state
doctrine does not."7 According to this approach, the two
doctrines "address different concerns and apply in different
circumstances."8 Consequently, both doctrines are best served by
allowing each to stand on independent legs.
Section two of this Comment examines the different origins
of foreign sovereign immunity and the act of state doctrine. The
third section scrutinizes the policy implications of a merging of
the two doctrines as announced in Environmental Tectonics, and
compares that approach to the one announced in LAM. Finally,
the fourth section investigates the distinct historical application
and legislative intent served by the two doctrines. This Comment
will show that upon close examination, the "commercial excep-
tion" to the act of state doctrine is a much narrower rule than the
"commercial exception" to foreign sovereign immunity under the
FSIA. As a result, the FSIA's mechanical "nature-purpose"
distinction is improper, inappropriate, and unworkable when
applied to an act of state.
2. THE ORIGINS OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, THE
ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE, AND THE "COMMERCIAL
EXCEPTIONS" TO BOTH
From the beginning, foreign sovereign immunity and the act
of state doctrine were never inextricably bound. Although a
party may invoke both at certain times, and often does when a
6 International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, (LAM) v. OPEC,
649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981).





foreign state finds itself as a defendant in a civil action, each rule
has its own underpinnings and distinct purposes. Stated briefly,
foreign sovereign immunity, codified most recently as the FSIA,
grants immunity to foreign states for most of their official or
governmental actions. The act of state doctrine, a purely judge-
made rule, operates as an issue preclusion device, preventing
federal and state courts from sitting in judgement on the official
actions of foreign states. This initial section examines both the
legal and political origins of these doctrines, as well as their
respective "commercial activity" exceptions.
2.1. The Origins of the FSIA: From Absolute to Restrictive
Immunity
The foreign sovereign immunity doctrine in the United States
was born of nineteenth century precepts which sought to uphold
the honor and dignity of a sovereign and its agents. Today's more
modern approach acknowledges the nation-state's involvement and
accountability as a player in the international marketplace.
Schooner Excb. v. McFaddon' was an early Supreme Court case, in
which the Court made its initial endorsement of sovereignimmunity. In that case, Chief Justice Marshall stated that "[t]he
jurisdiction of the nation, within its own territory, is necessarily
exclusive and absolute; it is susceptible of no limitation, not
imposed by itself."1 ° This unanimous decision saw the Court
extend sovereign immunity to hold a French warship immune
from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts." The Court declared that
the "implied license" by which the ship entered port may be seen
as "containing an exemption from the jurisdiction of the sover-
eign. " 12  The Court determined that denial of this immunity
would improperly curtail the foreign state's power and dignity.13
Although often seen as the beginning of the period of "absolute
immunity," the narrow facts of this case did not address the
1 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
10 Id. at 136.
1 See id. at 147; see also Joan E. Donoghue, Taking the "Sovereign" Out of
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: A Functional Approach to the Commercial
Activity Exception, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 489, 495 (1992).
12 Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 144.
13 See Note, Sovereign Immunity of States Engaged in Commercial Activities,
65 COLUM. L. REv. 1086, 1086 (1965).
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question of how broadly to apply this doctrine.14
Not until Berizzi Bros. v. Steamship Pesaro15 did the Supreme
Court fully embrace the concept of "absolute immunity." In this
case, the Court accepted the Italian government's contention that
a libel action brought against a vessel owned by Italy, but used in
merchant trade, must nevertheless be dismissed on the basis of
sovereign immunity. 6 Here, the Court announced the "absolute
doctrine," holding that international law bars one state's courts
from adjudicating over the person or property of a foreign
state.17  This "absolute doctrine," which applied Schooner's
theoretical underpinnings, stressed a highly personal theory of
government in which the preservation of a foreign sovereign
authority's dignity was a common reason to extend immunity.18
Eventually, these notions of personal sovereign authority fell into
disfavor and the importance of absolute immunity declined. Due
to these changes, the era of absolute immunity was short-lived.
In the place of absolute immunity came the more modern
view of "restrictive" sovereign immunity. According to this view,
the public or sovereign acts of a governmental authority enjoy
immunity, but its private acts do not.19 In 1952, the U.S. State
Department officially adopted this view of immunity, stating that
"[a]ccording to the... restrictive theory of sovereign immunity,
the immunity of the sovereign is recognized with regard to
sovereign or public acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not with
14 See Donoghue, supra note 11, at 496 n.25. Although some courts cite
Schooner Exchange as an endorsement of "absolute immunity" for foreign states,
.the opinion concludes that '[a] prince, by acquiring private property in a
foreign country, may possibly be considered as subjecting that property to the
territorial jurisdiction [of that state].'" Id. (citing Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) at 145) (alterations in original). Even this early decision saw the
possible difficulties of foreign commercial immunity.
15 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
16 See Note, supra note 13, at 1087.
17 See id.
1" See Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria Gen. de Abastecimientos y
Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 357 (2d Cir. 1964) ("The doctrine originated in an
era of personal sovereignty, when kings could theoretically do no wrong and
when the exercise of authority by one sovereign over another indicated
hostility or superiority.").
19 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 14 (1976) ("[S]overeign immunity of
foreign states should be 'restricted' to cases involvin acts of a foreign state




respect to private acts (jure gestionis)."2° With this statement, the
State Department shied away from "dignity" concerns and began
inquiring into the nature of a sovereign's acts for the purpose of
determining whether or not immunity for a given case is appro-
priate.2 ' At this point, however, courts had not yet begun to
make that determination themselves. Instead, judicial deference to
executive suggestions of immunity was routine practice.'
In 1976, this acquiescence to the executive came to an end
with the enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.'
This statute called for independent determinations of sovereign
immunity by the courts.24 Much like the State Department's
approach, courts were to distinguish a government's sovereign act
from a merely private act conducted by a government or a
government's agent. 5  Unlike the executive approach, the Act
specifically delineated various exceptions under which immunity
would not attach.26 Presumably, when a governmental act fell
under one of the enumerated exceptions, that act became fully
adjudicable? By enacting these exceptions, Congress codified
20 Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser to the Department of
State, to Philip B. Pelman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted
in 26 Dep't St. Bull. at 984 (1952).
21 See Donoghue, supra note 11, at 497. "By the time the U.S. State
Department adopted the restrictive theory..., te enormous expansion in
international commerce meant that most foreign state immunity cases
concerned trading activities and contractual obligations, not royalty and their
ships, diminishing the persuasiveness of 'dignity' as a rationale for foreign state
immunity." Id. (footnotes omitted).
' See David A. Brittenham, Note, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and
Commercial Activity: A Conflicts Approach, 83 CoLuM. L. REV. 1440, 1453
(1983) ("[T]he executive branch played a dominant role in the evolution of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity.").
' See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90
Stat. 2891 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. SS 1602-1611 (1994)).
24 See 28 U.S.C. S 1602 (1994) ("Claims of foreign states to immunity
should henceforth be decided by courts of the United States and of the States
in conformity with the principles set forth in this chapter."). In addition, the
statute's legislative history stresses that one important purpose of the FSIA "is
to transfer the determination of sovereign immunity from the executive branch
to the judicial branch, thereby reducing the foreign policy implications of
immunity determinations." H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976).
' See Brittenham, supra note 22, at 1455-58.
26 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1994).
' See Brittenham, supra note 22, at 1442 ("[T]he plaintiff's cause of action
must fall within one of the Act's enumerated exceptions.").
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"restrictive" view, denying immunity in certain instances.28 One
such important statutory exception is the "commercial activity"
29exception.
2.2. "Nature" v. 'Purpose"
Since the enactment of the FSIA, courts have held that foreign
activities which are essentially commercial are considered "private"
acts and do not carry the same sovereign interests as public
acts. Therefore, immunity does not attach to these types of
commercial activities. The FSIA states that a commercial activity
is "either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular
commercial transaction or act. The commercial character of an
activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the
course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by
reference to its purpose."31 Although at times it has been difficult
to make this distinction, the Supreme Court has held that the
FSIA mandates discerning an action's nature without regard to its
purpose.32
By stressing the activity's nature over its stated purpose, the
Act's definition of "commercial activity" seeks to establish
uniformity in foreign immunity law.33  According to the Su-
preme Court, "[w]hen it enacted the FSIA, Congress expressly
28 See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 610-11 (1992)
(noting that foreign sovereigns are immune from U.S. jurisdiction "unless one
of several statutorily defined exceptions applies").
29 See 28 U.S.C. S 1605(a)(2) (1994).
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of
the United States or of the States in any case ... in which the action
is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by
the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere;
or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act
causes a direct effect in the United States ....
Id.
i See Republic of Argentina, 504 U.S. at 614. "[A] foreign state engaging
in 'commercial' activities 'do[es] not exercise powers peculiar to sovereigns';
[sic] rather, it 'exercise[s] only those powers that can also be exercised by
private citizens.'" Id. (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
31 28 U.S.C. S 1603(d) (1994).
32 See Republic of Argentina, 504 U.S. at 617.
3 See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba,




acknowledged 'the importance of developing a uniform body of
law' concerning the amenability of a foreign sovereign to suit in
United States courts."34 In order to insure consistency, the Act
relies on an activity's nature to discourage forum-shopping, which
could lead to the embarrassing result of a state court ruling
contrary to established federal foreign policy."
More importantly, the Act's definition of "commercial
activity" makes its application more effective. Congress' focus on
the "nature" rather than the "purpose" of an activity, prevents a
foreign government from always claiming a "public" purpose to
each of its commercial transactions. Presumably, every time a
"government enters the marketplace to buy or sell goods, its
purpose ultimately is not to earn profits; in some sense, its
motivation is the public good. Consequently, if the purpose of an
activity defined in full whether the activity was sovereign or
commercial, all governmental activities would be sovereign."36
However, by stressing the activity's "nature," Congress opted for
a more objective standard to determine an activity's "commercial-
ity," thus avoiding what would otherwise amount to a trouble-
some inquiry into a foreign state's motivation.37
Later cases have sought to further disambiguate this definition
of "commercial activity." Most notably, the "private person" test
has emerged as the dominant application of the FSIA's "nature"
standard.3' According to this standard, a court considers whether
or not the relevant activity is commercial by asking whether a
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 32 (1976)).
3 See id. "[M]atters bearing on the Nation's foreign relations 'should not
be left to divergent and perhaps parochial state interpretations.'" Id. (quoting
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964)).
36 De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1393 (5th Cir.
1985) (holding that purpose may sometimes be referred to in order to
disambiguate an activity's nature). But see Republic of Argentina, 504 U.S. at
616-17 (restricting the De Sanchez holding). Although Republic of Argentina
severely limits the applicabiliy of De Sanchez, the above dicta remains a well-
established underpinning of the FSIA's definition of a commercial activity.
" See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 360-61 (1993). "[T]he question
is not whether the foreign government is acting with a profit motive ....
Rather, the issue is whether the particular actions that the foreign state
performs (whatever the motive behind them) are the type of actions by which
a private party engages in 'trade and traffic or commerce.'" Republic of
Argentina, 504 U.S. at 614.
" See Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647
F.2d 300, 309 (2d Cir. 1981).
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private person can engage in the activity.39 By referring to the
basic "private" - "public" distinction, courts have returned to the
"restrictive immunity" theoretical roots of the FSIA to disambig-
uate the commercial exception.? Thus, the commercial exception
is essentially a codification of the "restrictive" view's contention
that when a foreign sovereign acts as a private actor in the
marketplace, it cannot escape liability via immunity. In short, the
commercial exception is a method of insuring the accountability
of sovereigns engaged in international commerce who would
otherwise not be subject to suit in U.S. courts.
2.3. The Act of State Doctrine
Unlike foreign sovereign immunity, the act of state doctrine
has never been codified. The doctrine is a purely judge-made rule
that has been the subject of much controversy and uncertainty
since its inception in the 1897 case of Underhill v. Hernandez.4'
That decision, which has become the basis for the doctrine's
modern application, stated:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence
of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the govern-
ment of another done within its own territory. Redress of
grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through
the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as
between themselves. 42
Modern commentators have re-phrased the doctrine to read as
follows:
In the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement
regarding controlling legal principles, courts in the United
States will generally refrain from examining the validity of
39 See id.
' See Republic of Argentina, 504 U.S. at 612-13 ("The meaning of
'commercial' is the meaning generally attached to that term under the
restrictive theory at the time the statute was enacted.").
41 168 U.S. 250 (1897).




a taking by a foreign state of property within its own
territory, or from sitting in judgement on other acts of a
governmental character done by a foreign state within its
own territory and applicable there.43
Under either statement, the main purpose of the act of state
doctrine is to prevent American courts from adjudicating those
acts of a foreign government purely sovereign in nature.' It is an
issue preclusion device that will shield a foreign government's
activity from being examined in American courts. 45 However,
such issue preclusion does not necessarily entail dismissal of an
entire action."
Various rationales have been suggested for the act of state
doctrine. To the extent that the doctrine was developed to avoid
disrespect to foreign governments, the rule is related, in some
part, to the rules of foreign sovereign immunity.7 The core
concern of modern application, however, is not international
comity, but the constitutional issues of preserving the separation
of powers between the judiciary and the executive branches of the
federal government." Since primary authority for conducting
foreign affairs is vested in the executive branch, judicial "engage-
43 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FORE IGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES S 443(1) (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493
U.S. 400, 406 (1990) (stating that "[t]he act of state doctrine is not some vague
doctrine of abstention but a "principle of decision' binding on federal and state
courts alike").
41 See Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052,
1057-58 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that "the courts of this country will refrain
from judging the validity of a foreign state s governmental acts in regard to
matters within that country's borders"), affd, 493 U.S. 400 (1990); Harold
Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2366
n.106 (1991) ("[Tlhe Act of State doctrine is not a general rule of abstention in
cases that may embarrass foreign governments, but a federal choice-of-law rule
that applies only when the validity of a foreign sovereign act is at issue.").
46 See Gallejo v. Bancomer, 764 F.2d 1101, 1113 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that
under the act of state doctrine, "courts exercise jurisdiction but decline to
decide certain issues").
47 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 43, § 443 cmt. a.
" See United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1523 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
("More recent interpretations of the doctrine instead emphasize the separation
of powers rationale-more specifically, the need to preclude judicial encroach-
ment in the field of foreign policy and international diplomacy."), aff'd, 117
F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 1997).
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ment in the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state
may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of goals
both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the
international sphere."49 Therefore, U.S. courts must decline to
adjudicate foreign actions that may impede or prevent the political
branches of government from conducting foreign affairs. Modem
jurisprudence favors resolving this type of dispute through the
political process, despite the fact that some litigants may have no
other available domestic forum in which to settle their otherwise
meritorious claims.5 0 According to the act of state doctrine,
judicial inquiry into these claims might frustrate the conduct of
national foreign policy."'
However, according respect to the government's system of
checks and balances remains merely an underpinning of the
doctrine, and does not constitute a comprehensive guideline for its
application. The Supreme Court made this point clear in 1990,
when it reviewed its first act of state case in almost fifteen
years.' WS. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics
Corp., Intl5" presented the Court an opportunity to examine the
weight that should be accorded such "separation" concerns in act
of state cases.54 According to that decision:
49 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
" See Environmental Tectonics, 847 F.2d at 1058. The doctrine's
"application in effect means that 'on occasion individual litigants may have to
forgo decisions on the merits of their claims because the involvement of the
courts in such a decision might frustrate the conduct of the Nation's foreign
policy.'" Id. (quoting First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406
U.S. 759, 769 (1972)).
51 See id.
52 See Koh, supra note 45, at 2366 n.106.
53 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
" See id. at 405. It is worthwhile to note here that this case came to the
Court on appeal from the Third Circuit. The Court did not affirm this case
on the grounds presented in the lower case. Instead, the Court resisted the
chance to examine the applicability of the commercial exception by stating:
The parties have argued at length about the applicability of these
possible exceptions, and, more generally, about wtether the purpose
of the act of state doctrine would be firthered by its application in
this case. We find it unnecessary, however, to pursue those inquiries,
since the factual predicate for application of the act of state doctrine
does not exist.
Id.




[c]ourts in the United States have the power, and ordinari-
ly the obligation, to decide cases and controversies proper-
ly presented to them. The act of state doctrine does not
establish an exception for cases and controversies that may
embarrass foreign governments, but merely requires that,
in the process of deciding, the acts of foreign sovereigns
taken within their own jurisdictions shall be deemed
valid. 5
Conversely, where the validity of a foreign government's action
within its own borders is not in question, the act has no applica-
tion. 6 Courts have since cited this case as setting forth a clearer
doctrine.7
2.4. The Commercial Activity Exception to the Act of State
Doctrine
The Restatement's definition of an act of state specifically
provides that American courts will not adjudicate matters based
on activities by foreign sovereigns "of a governmental charac-
ter."58  This language reflects the current judicial trend of only
applying the act of state doctrine to those actions which are
considered "sovereign." Where an act is not imbued with
sovereign character, the threat of disrupting foreign relations is
less imposing and the courts will usually decide to adjudicate the
claim. Put simply, where a government is not acting as a
government, its actions are not acts of state at all, and the rule is
not available to preclude judicial inquiry.
different approaches to the applicability of the act of state doctrine's commer-
cial exception remains unresolved.
15 Id. at 409.
56 See id. at 409-10.
17 See Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 707 n.8
(9th Cir. 1992).
Since the Kirkpatrick case, some courts have even gone as far as articulat-
ing a two-step test for application of the doctrine. See Eckert Int'l, Inc. v.
Sovereign Democratic Republic of Fiji, 834 F. Supp. 167, 171 (E.D. Va. 1993)
("First, the act undertaken by the foreign state must be public, and second, the
act must be completed within the sovereign's territory."), afPd, 32 F.3d 77 (4th
Cir. 1994).
58 RESTATEMENT, supra note 43, S 443(1).
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When a government engages in a purely commercial act, some
court decisions have held that such an act is not protected by the
doctrine. This so-called "commercial exception" to the act of state
doctrine was first announced in the Supreme Court plurality
opinion in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba.9
In this case, the Court held that the act of state doctrine does not
protect "the repudiation of a purely commercial obligation owed
by a foreign sovereign or by one of its commercial instrumentali-
ties."' Although never announced by a majority of the Supreme
Court, the commercial activity exception to the act of state
doctrine has never been rebuffed by any appellate circuit, and has,
in fact, been mentioned as dicta by most appellate circuits.
61
Moreover, Congress' passing of the FSIA, in part, relied upon the
existence of the commercial exception.62 Thus, for the purposes
of this Comment, it will be assumed that the commercial excep-
tion, if not an ultimate legal reality, is at the very least a doctrine
with considerable vitality in federal courts today.
2.5. Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the Act of State Doctrine
Contrasted
Both the act of state doctrine and foreign sovereign immunity
are rooted in considerations of respect for independent authorities,
state equality, and the perceived limitations on the domestic
59 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
60 Id. at 695.
61 See, e.g., Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d
1052 (3d Cir. 1988), affid, 493 U.S. 400 (1990); Compania de Gas de Nuevo
Laredo, S.A. v. Entex, Inc., 686 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1982); Hunt v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977); Flota Maritima Brownig de Cuba, Sociadad
Anonima v. Motor Vessel Ciudad de la Habana, 335 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1964).
62 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 20 n.1 (1976).
The committee has found it unnecessary to address the act of state
doctrine in this legislation [the FSIA] since decisions such as that in
the Dunhill case demonstrate that our courts already have considerable
guidance enabling them to reject improper assertions of the act of state
doctrine. For example, it appears that the doctrine would not apply
to the cases covered by H.R. 11315, whose touchstone is a concept of




ACT OF STA TE
judiciary to sit in judgment on the actions of another state.63
Although, the recent "restrictive" view of immunity and the FSIA
have allowed greater judicial examination of foreign actions, these
actions (as a result of the statute's language) are necessarily limited
to activities carried out in or related to the United States.64 The
act of state doctrine, on the other hand, characteristically
encompasses activities of foreign states in their own territories. 5
The FSIA addresses the allowable jurisdiction of the courts, while
the act of state doctrine addresses "the permissible scope of
inquiry by courts into particular issues presented." 66 Sovereign
immunity and the act of state doctrine may be raised in the same
case, and often are in instances where the foreign state (or its
agent) is itself a party to an action. However, the two rules
remain distinct. In short, the FSIA deals with the capacity of a
foreign state to be sued for its actions, while the act of state
doctrine operates as an issue preclusion device. Of the two rules,
only sovereign immunity will necessarily render an action non-
adjudicable. Where the act of state doctrine prevents consider-
ation of the validity of a government's action, the underlying
claim may still be properly decided if it can otherwise proceed.
Against this backdrop lie the commercial exceptions to each
of these rules. When examined in light of their respective origins,
both commercial exceptions can be seen as requiring separate
characterizations. The FSIA's commercial exception operates as
a method of combating blanket immunity and pursuing fairness
in the international marketplace by making all commercial actors
(private or governmental) accountable. In contrast, the act of
63 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 43, S 443 reporters' note 11 (contrasting




67 See Hargrove v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 937 F. Supp. 595, 601
(S.D. Tex. 1996).
A conclusion that the act of state doctrine is applicable to the case,
however, does not divest this Court of subject matter jurisdiction over
the action; instead, the act of state doctrine operates as a super choice-
of-law rule, requiring a court to apply the law of the foreign state as
the rule of decision vhen faced wit challenges to the official acts of
a sovereign government.
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state's commercial exception is better thought of as an exemption.
For the purposes of the act of state doctrine, a foreign govern-
ment's commercial activities are not acts of state at all. In this
distinction lie the reasons why the FSIA's commercial activity
definition should not be read into the act of state's commercial
exception.
3. ISSUE PRECLUSION V. JURISDICTION
As mentioned above, foreign sovereign immunity and the act
of state doctrine are two distinct rules, with the former concern-
ing amenability to suit and the latter dealing with the appropriate-
ness of a court sitting in judgment of a foreign government's
acts.6" However, while the FSIA has codified an approach to its
commercial exception, the act of state doctrine's commercial
exception remains unresolved. One obstacle to this exception's
evolution is unquestionably the elusive definition of what
constitutes a "commercial activity." Unlike the FSIA's "nature"
definition, the act of state doctrine's commercial exception has no
statutory scheme of its own on which to rely. Nevertheless, upon
examination of the principles underlying the act of state doctrine
and the checkered past of the FSIA's "nature-purpose" distinction,
it appears that relying on the FSIA's definition of "commercial
activity" for guidance would result in unwanted ramifications.
3.1. The Comparative Narrowness of the Act of State's
Commercial Exception
According to some courts, the commercial exceptions to the
two doctrines should be uniform so as to "effectuate the legislative
intent that the FSIA not be undermined by improper assertion of
the act of state defense."69 According to this line of reasoning,
the act of state defense should not be available as a "back door" to
a sovereign party who has already been denied foreign sovereign
immunity pursuant to the FSIA's commercial exception.' This
68 See supra Part 2.5.
69 Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896, 907 (E.D. Mich.
1981).
7 See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682,
705 (1976) (stating that "the mere assertion of sovereignty as a defense to a
claim arising out of purely commercial acts by a foreign sovereign is no more




reasoning is a severe criticism of the Ninth Circuit's approach to
the act of state doctrine espoused in LAM, as demonstrating how
two different standards may weaken the FSIA.
71
Although a well reasoned position, this argument only
addresses those cases where the government, which committed the
purported "act of state," is also a party to the action at hand.
However, the act of state doctrine is not limited to such instanc-
es. 72 Indeed, "[w]hen determining whether the act of state
doctrine limits adjudication in American courts, we look not only
to the acts of the named defendants, 'but [to] any governmental
acts whose validity would be called into question by adjudication
of the suit."' 73
Because the act of state doctrine is an issue preclusion device,7 4
primary attention should be paid to the action rather than the
actor. Thus, the doctrine is often invoked in cases where the
named government is not a party at all. The acts of foreign
governments may be at issue far more frequently under the act of
state doctrine than they would under foreign sovereign immunity
when governments themselves are directly involved in controver-
sies. 5
As a result of this greater frequency, a court's potential
immunity'").
71 See Michael J. Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA.
L. REV. 325, 353 (1986) (arguing that "under the court's analysis, what the
foreign sovereign cannot get through the 'front door' of the FSIA, it obtains
through the 'back door' of the act of state doctrine").
72 See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1113 (5th Cir. 1985).
[Where] the defendant is a private party, not an instrumentality of a
foreign state, and even if the suit is not based specifically on a
sovereign act, we nevertheless decline to decide the merits of the case
if in doing so we would need to judge the validity of the public acts
of a sovereign state performed within its own territory.
Id.
7' Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines, 965 F.2d
1375, 1387-88 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1113 (alteration in
original).
' See Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371, 1380 (5th
Cir. 1980) ("[The act of state doctrine] does not simply relieve the foreign
government of liability for its acts, but operates as an issue preclusion device,
foreclosing judicial inquiry into the validity or propriety of such acts in
litigation between any set of parties.").
7 See Bazyler, supra note 71, at. 354-55 ("[V]irtually every international
dispute may involve a foreign sovereign in some respect.").
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opportunities to sit in judgment on a foreign state's actions are
not limited to situations where that state is a party. In such cases,
immunity is never invoked. To safeguard against inappropriate
adjudication, the act of state doctrine traditionally takes measure
of the possible embarrassment and hinderance posed to national
foreign policy. The doctrine's commercial exception is merely
one way of framing this balancing test.76 In other words, when
an action is deemed "commercial" and exempted from the act of
state doctrine, the court presumably has already taken into
account the traditional balance of interests crucial to deeming a
governmental action not an act of state.' In contrast, when
dealing with the statutory scheme announced by the FSIA, this
balancing of interests may be avoided by the Act's rigid statutory
criteria.78 Although focusing only on an activity's "nature" may
be appropriate under the FSIA when trying to prevent a sovereign
from unfairly availing itself of the international market, complete-
ly ignoring an activity's "purpose" may be inappropriate when
deciding whether or not to preclude an issue.79
76 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 43, S 443 reporters' note 6. One of the
justifications set forth in the Dunhill opinion's adoption of a commercial
exception to the act of state doctrine is the fact that "in commercial dealings,
as contrasted with matters such as expropriation, there is a broad international
consensus as to the applicable rules of law, so that a decision against the
validity of the foreign act would be unlikely to 'touch sharply on the nerves'
of members of the international community." Id. (citation omitted). Section
443 also lists the exception's similarity to the commercial activity exception to
the doctrine of sovereign immunity as the other justification offered by the
Dunhill majority. See . However, that section correctly notes that this is the
very analogy to which the four dissenters would not acquiesce, resulting in no
majority opinion. See id. Consequently, this "uniformity" argument appears
to be the weaker of the two reasonings. See id.
' See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682,
704 (1976).
In their commercial capacities, foreign governments do not exercise
powers peculiar to sovereigns. Instead, they exercise only those
powers that can also be exercised by private citizens. Subjecting them
in connection with such acts to the same rules of law that apply to
private citizens is unlikely to touch very sharply on "national nerves."
Id.
78 See Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896, 907-08 (E.D.
Mich. 1981) ("[T]he Act of State Doctrine commands a balancing process that
may, in contrast, be avoided in the sovereign immunity context under the
mechanical criteria established by the FSIA.").
71 See International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, (1AM) v.




Since act of state concerns, in theory, pose a greater threat of
frustrating national foreign policy than sovereign immunity issues
do, the use of the FSIA's mechanical "nature" definition of
"commerciality" to determine the applicability of the act of state
doctrine is not a strong enough "lock" on the doctrine's trouble-
some "back door." The act of state doctrine requires flexibility to
meet its objectives of protecting the separation of powers and
preventing judicial interference in foreign policy. This flexibility
is better served by a narrower commercial exception. Such an
exception should take into consideration a government's purposes,
along with all the facts necessary to complete the balancing of
interests required by act of state jurisprudence. The FSIA's
"nature" definition is simply too broad for the act of state
doctrine to effectively balance sovereign interests.
3.2. The "Nature-Purpose" Distinction Is Not Trouble-free
The FSIA's reliance on an activity's "nature" to determine its
commercial character is a problematic standard that has been
sharply criticized by commentators and courts alike. While
seemingly a simple standard to apply, commentators have
continuously warned against the troublesome results that may
arise from such an application."0 Long before the FSIA's enact-
ment, critics noted that a "nature-purpose" distinction led some
literal-thinking European courts to hold that "'.... purchases of
bullets or shoes for the army, the erection of fortifications for
defense, or the rental of a house for an embassy are private
acts.' '. Indeed, more than one commentator has noted the
circular logic displayed by 5 1603(b) of the FSIA."2
Courts have also expressed frustration with the FSIA's
diluted by the commercial activity exception which limits the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.... [T]he act of state doctrine and the doctrine of
sovereign immunity address different concerns .... ").
'0 See Note, supra note 13, at 1096 ("While this test is easy to apply, it has
often led to absurd results...
. Id. (quoting Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abasticim-
ientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 359 (2d Cir. 1964)).
82 See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Litigating a Sovereign Immunity Claim-The
Haiti Case, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 377, 435 n.244 (1974) ("Start with 'activity,'
proceed via 'conduct' or 'transaction' to 'character,' then refer to 'nature,' and
then go back to 'commercial,' the term you started out to define in the first
place.!).
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ambiguous formulation. In 1993, the Supreme Court referred to
the definition of "commercial" offered in § 1603(b), stating that
the Act is "too 'obtuse' to be of much help," and that "[i]f this is
a definition, it is one distinguished only by its diffidence; as we
observed in our most recent case on the subject, it 'leaves the
critical term "commercial" largely undefined.' 83  Faced with the
FSIA's "nature-purpose" distinction, some courts have been even
more blatant in discarding the statute, stating that "courts faced
with the question whether a particular act or series of acts
constitutes commercial activity have ignored this circular defini-
tion and have, consistent with the intent of Congress, defined the
concept on an evolving, case-by-case basis."8 4 One court even
went as far as to suggest that an activity's purpose is vital to
understanding its nature.
We do not interpret this provision [§ 1603(d)], howev-
er, to bar us totally from considering the purposes of
different types of activities. Indeed, we do not believe that
an absolute separation is always possible between the
ontology and the teleology of an act .... Indeed, commer-
cial acts themselves are defined largely by reference to their
purpose. What makes these acts commercial is not some
ethereal essence inhering in the conduct itself; instead, as
Congress recognized, acts are commercial because they are
generally engaged in for profit.8 5
Unfortunately for these frustrated courts, the Supreme Court
disallowed courts from referring to purpose to disambiguate an
activity's nature in 1992, stating that "[h]owever difficult it may
be in some cases to separate 'purpose' . . . from 'nature' . . ., the
statute unmistakably commands that to be done."
8 6
Nevertheless, the Court cannot do away with the inadequacies
83 Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 358-59 (1993) (quoting Republic
of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 612 (1992)).
84 Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines, 965 F.2d
1375, 1384 (5th Cir. 1992).
" De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1393 (5th Cir.
1985).





of existing law. As this brief sampling demonstrates, "the FSIA's
commercial activity exception is insufficiently specific and its
application is confusing and difficult to predict." 7 Reading such
a quagmire into another commercial exception would not only
frustrate the use of that law, but the resulting influx of even more
unguided, inconsistent applications of the "nature" definition
would provide commentators still more fodder to fire at the faulty
definition.
4. LEGAL HISTORY DOES NOT FAVOR USING THE FSIA
DEFINITION
Finally, the legal history of the commercial exception to the
act of state doctrine usually favors lending at least some weight to
an activity's purpose to determine whether or not it is a commer-
cial act. Both past precedent and legislative history suggest that
the FSIA definition of a "commercial" activity should not be read
into the act of state doctrine.
4.1. Past Precedent and Application of the Commercial Exception
to Act of State
Since the inception of the act of state doctrine in Dunhill to
its most recent applications, courts have consistently looked at an
activity's purpose when deciding whether or not to apply the act
of state's commercial exception. In one recent case, the Southern
District of New York stated that:
[W]hile the nationalization of oil property in Hunt was
accompanied by political statements suggesting reprisal
against the United States as the motive and indicating that
the nationalization was a public act, the seizure of Galadari's
property was not accompanied by any such political state-
ments. Non-public or commercial acts do not fall within
the ambit of the Act of State Doctrine."8
Here, the court not only looked to the activity's motive, but also
17 Donoghue, supra note 11, at 517.
" Drexel Burnham Lambert Group Inc. v. Committee of Receivers for
Galadari, 810 F. Supp. 1375, 1391 n.23 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 12 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 1993).
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went as far as to afford great weight to a government's statements
as evidence of that motive.89 Had this case been decided under
the FSIA "nature" definition of "commercial," the sovereign
foreign defendants may have escaped liability for its confiscation
of the plaintiff's investment when it assumed control of a foreign
bank.
In a different case, the Second Circuit was called upon to
decide whether to adjudicate an action which would have
mandated scrutinizing the Mexican government's issuance of
exchange controls.9" The plaintiffs claimed that Mexico's new
exchange controls prevented the non-sovereign defendant from
performing its contractual obligations to its American creditor.91
To decide the case on its merits, the court would have had to "sit
in judgment" on this governmental action. In deciding otherwise,
the court held that "[t]his action, taken by the Mexican govern-
ment for the purpose of saving its national economy from the
brink of monetary disaster, surely represents the 'exercise [of]
powers peculiar to sovereigns. ' '92
In National Am. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,93 another
case out of New York's Southern District, the court not only
examined the motive behind a defendant's act, but actively
inquired into several pieces of evidence which provided circum-
" See Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68,73 (2d Cir. 1977) for an even
earlier use of a government's statements of purpose to determine an activity's
commercial/sovereign status. That decision noted that:
[U]p on the seizure of Hunt's property on June 11, 1973 President al-
Qadhafi announced "[W]e proclaim loudly that this United States
needs to be given a big hard blow in the Arab area on its cold,
insolent face. ... The time has come for the Arab peoples to
confront the United States, the time has come for the U.S. interests to
be threatened earnestly and seriously in the Arab area, regardless of the
cost." ... We conclude that the political act complained of here was
clearly within the act of state doctrine and that since the disputed
pleadings inevitably call for a judgment on the sovereign acts of Libya
the claim is non-justiciable.
Id. (alteration in original).
9 See Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222, 224 (2d Cir. 1985)
(affirming the dismissal on act of state grounds of claims involving the Mexican
government).
91 See id. at 223.
92 Id. at 225 (quoting Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,
425 U.S. 682, 704 (1976)) (alteration in original).




stantial proof of that motive. In that case, Nigeria asserted the act
of state doctrine to prevent the court from examining the
repudiation of several of that country's debts incurred as a result
of the government's dealings in cement contracts. 4 In that case,
the court noted that "the very act of forming a settlement
committee, paying for cement and processing demurrage docu-
ments, signifies an intent, espoused by the sovereign, to meet its
commercial obligations."95 The court went on to apply the
commercial exception and did not preclude the claim.96
In addition, commentators have operated under the assumption
that an examination of a sovereign's motive can often determine
whether or not an activity is "commercial." One proposed
example clearly demonstrates a situation where "purpose" may not
only be relevant but also dispositive.
For instance, if state X cancels a long-term supply
contract with a seller in the United States on the ground
that the seller had supplied defective merchandise, a
decision by a court in the United States in favor of the
seller would probably not violate internationally shared
expectations; in contrast, termination of the same contract
because X had broken relations with the United States or
had banned all "capitalist enterprises" might well involve
the kind of issue not appropriate for decision by the
judiciary.
9 7
According to this reasoning, the activity's purpose bears
strongly on its character. On one hand, ending the contract is a
purely commercial decision based on the merits or liabilities of
continuing the contractual relationship. On the other hand,
repudiation based on a political decision or a fundamental change
in a country's economic system would be inappropriate for
adjudication. It is immaterial that, from the seller's stance, the
repudiation in either case remains the same. In contrast, some
94 See id. at 641 ("[D]efendants claimed that the cement purchase was
intended for use in governmental works and military installations.").
95 Id.
96 See id.
' RESTATEMENT, supra note 43, § 443 reporters' note 6.
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commentators have adopted the stance that a similar contractual
situation under the FSIA would render exactly the opposite
result.98 One such hypothetical, proposed during legislative
hearings on the FSIA stated that "this would mean, for example,
that a foreign state's purchase of grain from a private dealer would
always be regarded as commercial, even if the grain were to serve
some important government purpose, such as replenishing
government stores or feeding an army."9 9 In light of the deci-
sions and the traditional formulation above, past precedent clearly
favors incorporating an activity's purpose in the act of state's
commercial exception.
4.2. Legislative History
Finally, even the legislative history of the FSIA plainly
preferred that Act not to be read into the act of state doctrine.
The FSIA was enacted to codify only the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.?° Furthermore, committee hearings explicitly stressed
the point that the FSIA does not propose to effect changes in the
act of state doctrine. °1 During one of these hearings, Monroe
Leigh, then the Legal Adviser to the State Department, stated that,
"in this particular bill, we have been careful ... to make it clear
that the bill applies only to the defense of sovereign immunity
and does not extend to the act of state doctrine."1 °2 Although this
statement does not explicitly mention the FSIA's "nature"
definition of "commerciality," such a definition follows from the
fact that the enactment of the Act came after the Dunhill decision,
and that Congress had every opportunity to speak to the FSIA's
effects on the act of state doctrine. Furthermore, during the
legislative evolution of the FSIA, the Dunhill decision and the
98 See id. S 453 reporters' note 2 (noting the importance of an activity's
nature under the restrictive theory of immunity).
" Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings on H.R.
11315 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations, 94th
Cong. 27 (1976) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal
Adviser, Department of State).
'10 See Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 651
F.2d 800, 813 (1st Cir. 1981) (stating that "[i]n principal part, FSIA simply
codifies contemporary concepts concerning the scope of sovereign immunity,
and entrusts to the courts the determination of immunity in individual cases").
101 See Hearings, supra note 99, at 34.
'02 Id. (emphasis added).
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commercial exception were explicitly referred to, yet never
altered.0 3 In the face of this legislative history, application of the
FSIA's definition of "commercial activity" to the act of state
doctrine would appear contrary to congressional intent.
5. CONCLUSION
In examining the act of state doctrine, the FSIA, and their
respective commercial exceptions, this Comment has sought to
show that the view adopted by the Second and Third Circuits of
applying the FSIA's definition of "commercial activity" to the act
of state doctrine' °4 is not the best reasoned approach. In trying
to establish uniformity, each rule's origins can at best be described
as somewhat related in certain instances, and at worst, completely
independent. Also, scrutinizing certain policy implications of this
"merging" of doctrines shows that both doctrines may suffer as a
result. Finally, a brief look at the historical application of the act
of state's commercial exception reveals clear evidence of a
historical aversion to utilizing the FSIA's "nature" approach. In
sum, although merging the two doctrines appears on its face to be
a worthwhile "tightening" of U.S. international law, such an
approach involves the danger of weakening one doctrine, and the
possible muddling of another. Allowing both rules to stand on
their own will allow future applications to approach a better
understanding of both rules and their respective exceptions.
'03 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 6-11 (1976) for a plain congressional
endorsement of the independence of the act of state doctrine, the Dunhill
decision, and the commercial exception from the FSIA.
104 See Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052,
1059 (3d Cir. 1988), aff'd, 493 U.S. 400 (1990); Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748
F.2d 790, 797 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying the FSIA's definition of "commercial").
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